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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Curtis

James Kaneaster appeals from the judgment 0f conviction entered

Kaneaster guilty of possessing a controlled substance.

When

it

found

district court erred

denied his motion t0 suppress.

Statement

Of The

Facts

In 2017, Curtis

grand

Kaneaster argues the

after a jury

theft,

And Course Of The Proceedings
James Kaneaster pled guilty

t0 a

and possession of a controlled substance.

number of charges, including

burglary,

The

imposed

(R., pp.71-82.)

a uniﬁed sentence of seven years With two years ﬁxed.

(R., p.76-79.)

released on parole, he had t0 sign an Idaho Department 0f Correction

m

(R., pp.84-86.)

district court

When

Kaneaster was

Agreement 0f Supervision.

The parole agreement included a consent and waiver provision:
I

and other

consent to the search of my person, residence, vehicle, personal property,
real property or structures

owned

0r leased

by me, or

for

which

I

am the

by any agent 0f IDOC 0r a law enforcement ofﬁcer.
rights under the Fourth Amendment and the Idaho constitution

controlling authority conducted
I

hereby waive

my

concerning searches.
(R., p.84.)

In 2019,

at

Ofﬁcer Gumeson With the Twin

2:00 a.m. (2/15/2019

Tr., p.4,

Falls Police

L.14 — p.6, L.9.) Ofﬁcer

he knew that Kaneaster had a warrant out for his
Kaneaster and the passenger t0 step out of the

Gumeson stopped Kaneaster because
5-18.)

He asked

(2/15/2019 TL, p.7, Ls.4-5.) Ofﬁcer

Gumeson

arrest.

car.

Department saw Kaneaster driving

(2/15/2019

Tr., p.5, Ls.

1

arrested Kaneaster and, in a search incident t0 the arrest, found a “butane lighter” that

used to smoke methamphetamine.
Kaneaster in the back 0f a patrol

an offer to

sit

in the

car.

(2/15/2019

Tr., p.7,

(2/15/2019

back of a patrol car

L.6 — p.8, L.6.)

Tr., p.7, Ls.6-19.)

t0 get out

of the snow.

is

typically

Ofﬁcer Gumeson put

The passenger then accepted
(2/15/2019

Tr., p.7, Ls.6-19.)

Ofﬁcer Gumeson “searched the vehicle because both occupants were on parole and had waived
their

Fourth

which

The

Amendment rights.”

tested presumptive positive for

state

He found a glass pipe that contained a White residue,

methamphetamine. (2/15/2019

Tr., p.8,

charged Kaneaster with possession of a controlled substance.

Kaneaster
64.)

(R., p.43.)

moved

He conceded

that

to suppress the evidence

that

occupants were on parole and had waived their Fourth

argued that the

state

in the car.

(R., pp.41-

he searched the vehicle because both

Amendment

rights.”

acting as an agent 0f a parole ofﬁcer at the time 0f the search.

But he

(R., p.62.)

could not rely 0n the parole agreement because Ofﬁcer

that Kaneaster did not

p. 10, L.16.)

(R., pp.23-25.)

Ofﬁcer Gumeson found

“Ofﬁcer Gumeson stated

L.13 —

(R., pp.60-63.)

Gumeson was
The

state

not

argued

have standing because Kaneaster “waived his constitutional rights

concerning searches” and “consented t0 searches by law enforcement officers.”

p.69

(R.,

(emphasis in 0riginal).)

At the hearing on the motion to
L.6

— p. 12,

L.20.) Neither side presented evidence and both sides relied

the record. (6/26/2019 Tr.,

that

suppress, the facts were not in dispute. (6/26/2019 Tr.,

p3, L.6 — p. 12, L20.) The

p3,

0n information already

district court rejected

in

Kaneaster’s argument

Ofﬁcer Gumeson acted outside the scope of the parole agreement because the agreement

Kaneaster signed “does not require the police ofﬁcer to be acting as an agent for the parole board”
t0

conduct a search. (6/26/2019

Tr., p.7, Ls.8-15.)

Relying 0n the parole agreement, the

court ruled Kaneaster did not have standing after ﬁnding “there

defendant’s Fourth

Amendment rights and that he consented t0

was a voluntary waiver

.

.

district

.

of the

the search.” (6/26/2019 Tr., p.1

1,

Ls.3 - 1 0.)

Kaneaster asked the

district court to

reconsider

its

decision. (7/15/2019 Tr., p.5, Ls.9-16.)

Rather than present any evidence, Kaneaster’s counsel put Kaneaster on the stand and had

Kaneaster read a lengthy legal argument. (7/15/2019

Tr., p.5,

L.18 — p.17, L3.)

He

argued that

only a parole ofﬁcer can conduct a search pursuant to a parole agreement, that an ofﬁcer

conducting a parole search violates the non—delegation doctrine, and that Ofﬁcer

motive throughout his entire actions.” (7/15/2019

Tr., p.7, L.1

— p.17,

L.2.)

Kaneaster presenting legal arguments through Witness testimony. (7/1 5/2019

The

district court

The

state objected to

Tr., p. 14,

it

would consider Kaneaster’s testimony

Ls.10-21.)

as legal argument.

Tr., p.16, Ls.1-15.)

district court judicially

noticed “the facts set forth in the probable cause affidavit” and

“the facts set forth at the preliminary hearing.” (7/15/2019 Tr., p.18, Ls.14-20.)

all

a

found Kaneaster had given “clearly inappropriate lay testimony” and sustained

the state’s objection but said

(7/15/2019

The

Gumeson “had

of Kaneaster’s arguments because Kaneaster “waive[d]

searches and seizures pursuant to the Fourth

Amendment”

enforcement ofﬁcer could have effectuated that search.”

[his] right t0

It

then rejected

be free 0f unreasonable

and, pursuant t0 his waiver, “any law

(7/15/2019

Tr., p.20, Ls.10-14.)

The

found “[t]he search was legally valid” and again denied Kaneaster’s motion

district court

t0

suppress. (7/15/2019 Tr., p.20, Ls.15-18.)

A jury
district court

found Kaneaster guilty of possessing a controlled substance.

imposed a sentence of six years With four years ﬁxed.

Kaneaster timely appealed.

(R., pp.156-60.)

(R., p.145.)

(R., p.138.)

The

ISSUES
Kaneaster states the issues 0n appeal

as:

v. Maxim, did the court err in denying the motion t0 suppress
based upon the ﬁnding that Mr. Kaneaster did not have standing?

A. Considering State

B.

Was the

C.

Does

search 0f the interior 0f the vehicle unreasonable?

the search provision of the parole agreement salvage the unreasonable

search?

D. Alternatively,

is

the search provision invalid because

it

exceeded the scope of
§ 5 0f the state

Board of Corrections under Art. X,
non-delegation
constitution and the
clause of Art. II, § 1?

the authority given to the

Can

E.

the state

show

the error in denying the motion t0 suppress

was harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt?
(Appellant’s brief, p.8.

The

state rephrases the issues as:

Has Kaneaster

1

1)

failed t0

show

the district court erred

A11 citations to the Appellant’s brief refer t0 the

August

13, 2020.

when

it

denied his motion t0 suppress?

Amended Opening

Brief 0f Appellant ﬁled on

ARGUMENT
Kaneaster Failed T0

A.

Show The

District

Court Erred

When It Denied His Motion To

Suppress

Introduction

The

district court

properly denied Kaneaster’s motion to suppress.

Ofﬁcer Gumeson’s

Amendment

rights fell Within the

search pursuant to Kaneaster’s consent and waiver of Fourth

well-recognized consent exception t0 the warrant requirement. Kaneaster failed t0 preserve in the
district court his

argument

that

Ofﬁcer Gumeson did not know about the search condition

Kaneaster’s parole agreement and, in

fact,

agreed in the

district court that

searched Kaneaster’s car precisely because Kaneaster had waived his Fourth

in

Ofﬁcer Gumeson

Amendment

rights.

Kaneaster’s argument that the search condition violated the non-delegation clause also

fails

because the parole search condition did not delegate any decision-making authority whatsoever,

much less decision-making
Gumeson conducted

B.

Standard

authority from one branch of government to another. In short, Ofﬁcer

a lawful consent-based search of Kaneaster’s car.

Of Review

This Court reviews a

district court’s

order resolving a motion t0 suppress “using a

bifurcated standard 0f review.” State V. Huffaker, 160 Idaho 400, 404, 374 P.3d 563, 567 (2016).

“This Court accepts the

trial

court’s ﬁndings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but

freely review the trial court’s application of constitutional principles in light 0f those facts.”

C.

Court Did Not Err

The

District

The

district court

When It Denied Kaneaster’s Motion To

I_d.

Suppress

properly denied Kaneaster’s motion to suppress. The Fourth

prohibits unreasonable searches. U.S. Const. amend. IV.

may

Amendment

A search is reasonable, however, when

conducted pursuant t0 a lawﬁllly issued search warrant or When the search ﬁts Within a well-

recognized exception t0 the warrant requirement. State
July 22, 2020).

V.

“One of those exceptions

.

.

.

is

V.

Hansen, No. 46805,

slip op. at 5

(Idaho

a search t0 Which an individual consents.”

m

Gawron, 112 Idaho 841, 843, 736 P.2d 1295, 1297 (1987) (quotations omitted).

A condition 0f probation 0r parole that requires “an advance waiver of fourth amendment
rights” qualiﬁes as consent under the Fourth

Amendment.

I_d.

In

m,

the defendant

had a

waiver and consent condition 0f probation: “That probationer does hereby agree and consent t0

any time and

the search of his person, automobile, real property, and any other property at

place

by any law enforcement

constitutional right to be free

at

any

ofﬁcer, peace ofﬁcer, 0r probation ofﬁcer, and does waive his

from such searches.”

736 P.2d

Li. at 842,

at 1296.

Citing the

probation condition, the Idaho Supreme Court found a warrantless search 0f the defendant’s house
reasonable because

it

fell

(1967), [0f] a search t0

m,

under the “exceptionﬂ

set forth in

Which an individual consents.”

Katz

v.

Li. at 843,

m

United States, 389 U.S. 347

736 P.2d

at

1297;

ﬂ

147 Idaho 206, 208-09, 207 P.3d 182, 184-85 (2009) (“While the United States Supreme

Court has not yet addressed whether a probationer

may waive

Amendment

his Fourth

rights

through acceptance 0f probationary search conditions, this Court has determined that a
probationer’s consent to searches constitutes a waiver of Fourth

Amendment

rights.”) (footnote

omitted); State V. Misner, 135 Idaho 277, 279, 16 P.3d 953, 955 (Ct. App. 2000) (“Thus, residential

searches

made pursuant

t0 a probationer’s

advance consent, Which was given as a condition of

probation, have been held valid”).

Kaneaster’s condition 0f parole justiﬁed the search in this case.
condition in

m,

Like the probation

the parole condition here required advance consent to law enforcement

searches and a waiver of Fourth

Amendment

rights.

Speciﬁcally, Kaneaster “consent[ed] to the

search 0f [his] person, residence, vehicle, personal property, and other real property or structures

owned

IDOC

or leased

by

[him], or for

which [he

is]

the controlling authority conducted

0r a law enforcement ofﬁcer” and “waive[d] [his] rights under the Fourth

by any agent of

Amendment and

the Idaho constitution concerning searches.” (R., p.84.) Kaneaster stipulated in the district court

that

he agreed t0 that condition prior t0 Ofﬁcer Gumeson’s search (6/26/2019

L4), and he acknowledged

that

were 0n parole and had waived
search thus
the Fourth

fell

Tr., p.4,

L.6

—

p.5,

Ofﬁcer Gumeson “searched the vehicle because both occupants
their

Fourth

Amendment

rights” (R., p.62).

Ofﬁcer Gumeson’s

within the consent exception t0 the warrant requirement and was reasonable under

Amendmentz

E m,

Kaneaster argues that the

state

112 Idaho

at 842,

736 P.2d

at

1296.

cannot rely on the search condition of parole to justify

Ofﬁcer Gumeson’s search because Ofﬁcer Gumeson did not know about the parole condition when
he conducted the search. (Appellant’s
to assert

it

in the district court.

raised before the

trial

court for

brief, pp.8-12.)

Kaneaster waived

this

argument by

“[B]oth the issue and the party’s position on the issue must be

it

t0

be properly preserved for appeal.” State

V.

Gonzalez, 165

Idaho 95, 99, 439 P.3d 1267, 1271 (2019). This means a defendant cannot raise a
appeal as t0

Why

the state cannot rely

0n a parole condition

Armstrong, 158 Idaho 364, 367-68, 347 P.3d 1025, 1028-29
defendant challenged state’s reliance 0n parole condition in the

2

While the

failing

t0 justify a search.

(Ct.

new

m

theory 0n

E

App. 2015) (holding, where

district court

by arguing “only that

argument as an attack on standing in the district court, it did
assert that “[t]he defendant’s motion to suppress fails because he waived his constitutional rights
concerning searches” and “consented to searches by law enforcement ofﬁcers of both his person
state characterized its

and 0f places over Which the defendant was exercising controlling authority.” (R., p.69 (emphasis
in original).) Moreover, as the Idaho Supreme Court has recently clariﬁed, an argument from the
state that an individual lacks standing based on a search condition in a probation or parole
agreement is best interpreted as an assertion that the search was reasonable based 0n consent
because the court’s “case law 0n Fourth Amendment waivers has consistently and correctly Viewed
them under the rubric of consent to searches.” State V. Maxim, 165 Idaho 901, 907, 454 P.3d 543,
549 (2019) (interpreting state’s argument that the defendant lacked standing based 0n a search
condition in his probation agreement as an assertion that the defendant consented t0 the search).

had exceeded the scope 0f his fourth Amendment waiver,”

the search

that defendant

waived

all

other arguments attacking the state’s reliance on the parole condition).

In the district court, Kaneaster asserted (and thus preserved) only

0n the parole condition:

the state’s reliance

two arguments against

exceeded the scope 0f the parole

(1) the search

condition (R., pp.60-63) and (2) the parole condition violated the non-delegation doctrine

(6/26/2019
did not

came

Tr., p.6, Ls.1 1-24).

know

Kaneaster never asserted in the

about the parole condition

at the

district court that

time of the search. In

Ofﬁcer Gumeson

fact, the closest

Kaneaster

commenting 0n Ofﬁcer Gumeson’s knowledge of the parole condition was an

t0

acknowledgment that Ofﬁcer Gumeson said he searched the car precisely “because both occupants
were on parole and had waived
0f logic,

it

Fourth

would have been impossible

“had waived

waived

their

[his]

Fourth

his Fourth

for

Amendment

rights.”

Ofﬁcer Gumeson

Amendment

rights.

Because there was no dispute
at the

parties (at least implicitly) agreed in the district court that

at

district court

0n an issue

that

because Kaneaster

it

in the district court over

fact,

both

Ofﬁcer Gumeson knew 0f the parole

never had an opportunity or reason t0 address the issue and the rules

1271 (“We Will not hold that a

position

a simple matter

time 0f the search—and, in

ofwaiver prohibit Kaneaster from raising the issue 0n appeal.
P.3d

t0 search the car

As

Amendment rights” if Ofﬁcer Gumeson did not know that Kaneaster had

Ofﬁcer Gumeson’s knowledge of the parole condition

condition—the

(R., p.62.)

trial

court erred in

E

Gonzalez, 165 Idaho

making a decision 0n an

at 99,

439

issue or a party's

did not have the opportunity to address.”).

Kaneaster also argues the search condition in his parole agreement violated the nondelegation clause 0f the Idaho Constitution. (Appellant’s brief, pp.12-14.) His argument suffers

from a fundamental problem. The non-delegation clause prohibits only “the
and judicial” departments from delegating

their authority t0

legislative, executive

one another. Idaho Const.

art. II § 1.

“The Board, with

its

constitutionally anchored control over prisons, paroles

recognized as an agency of the executive branch.” Mellinger

Idaho 494, 499, 757 P.2d 1213, 1218 (Ct. App. 1988).

V.

And

and probations,

is

Idaho Dep’t of Corrections, 114

the “law enforcement 0fﬁcer[s]”

referred to in Kaneaster’s parole agreement are not part of the legislative or judicial departments.

(R., p.84.)

Put simply, the non-delegation clause has n0 application here.

Even

setting aside that fundamental (and fatal) problem, Kaneaster’s

argument

because his parole agreement does not actually delegate any decision-making authority.
V.

Armstrong, 158 Idaho 364, 368-70, 347 P.3d 1025, 1029-31

(Ct.

fails

Em

App. 2015) (holding parole

search condition “does not involve any delegation 0f decision-making authority whatsoever”)

(emphasis in original).

had no authority

to

Under

the terms of Kaneaster’s parole agreement, “[t]he police ofﬁcers

engage in the general supervision 0f [Kaneaster] 0r his parole; the police

ofﬁcers could not determine Whether the terms 0f parole were being complied with, ﬁle a report

0f parole Violation, impose discretionary jail time, or enforce the terms of parole.” Li

Long before

the story of Kaneaster and Ofﬁcer

Gumeson began,

made the decision to require Kaneaster t0 consent in advance t0 all
ofﬁcers as one 0f his conditions of parole.

consented in writing t0
consent would

last

all

searches

by

searches

by all law enforcement

Kaneaster agreed to the condition and

law enforcement ofﬁcers.

may only revoke the

his consent.

C_f.

w,

(R., p.84.)

No. 46805,

That blanket
until either

he

slip op. at 8 (“[A]

consent given as a condition of probation at a hearing before the

court that entered the order granting probation in the ﬁrst place.”).

came

Board 0f Corrections

from the time Kaneaster signed his agreement of supervision

came off parole 0r formally revoked
probationer

all

(R., p.84.)

the

By the time Ofﬁcer Gumeson

into the picture, the decision-making related t0 Kaneaster’s parole search condition

was

ﬁnished.

Ofﬁcer Gumeson could search Kaneaster as a result of

condition itself properly

his parole condition, but the

came from the Board 0f Corrections.

Kaneaster distinguishes Armstrong on the basis that the ofﬁcer in Armstrong conducted a
search at the request 0f the defendant’s parole ofﬁcer whereas here Ofﬁcer
search Without contacting

distinction, but

when
71,

it

IDOC.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.13-14.)

He

is

Gumeson conducted
correct that that

at

a

only hurts his case. In Armstrong, the police ofﬁcer acted as an agent of IDOC

the parole ofﬁcer asked the police ofﬁcer to assist with a parole search.

347 P.3d

is

a

103 1-32. Here, 0n the other hand, Ofﬁcer

of IDOC and did not conduct a parole search.

He

Gumeson was

158 Idaho

at

370-

not acting at the behest

acted as a police ofﬁcer investigating a potential

drug crime by conducting a consent—based search after ﬁnding 0n Kaneaster’s person a butane
lighter typically

used t0 smoke methamphetamine. (2/15/2019

Gumeson had no need t0

co-opt

IDOC’s supervisory

Tr., p.7,

authority over Kaneaster or attempt to cloak

himself in the authority of a parole ofﬁcer because Ofﬁcer

Gumeson could conduct

consent-based search as a run-of—the-mill law enforcement ofﬁcer.
op. at 5 (“Consent

mere

L.22 — p.8, L.12.) Ofﬁcer

ﬂ m,

a lawful,

No. 46805,

slip

one of the ‘Well-recognized exceptions’ to the warrant requirement”). The

is

fact that Kaneaster’s consent resulted

Gumeson’s consent-based search

into

from

his parole condition did not transform

Ofﬁcer

an exercise of supervisory authority over a parolee.

Indeed, the plain language 0f Kaneaster’s parole agreement contemplated that Kaneaster

consented to parole searches as well other kinds of searches conducted by ordinary law

enforcement ofﬁcers: “I consent t0 the search of my person, residence, vehicle

any agent oleOC

ﬂ a law enforcement oﬁcer.”

that condition as too

so—and probably

(R.,

good reason.

.

.

conducted by

p.84 (emphasis added).) If Kaneaster Views

broad or burdensome, he should have attacked

for

.

it

as such.

But he

failed t0

do

ﬂ, gg, Samson V. California, 547 U.S. 843, 846-53 (2006)

10

(upholding state statute requiring

all

parolees to “agree in writing to be subj ect to search 0r seizure

by a parole ofﬁcer or other peace ofﬁcer

at

any time of the day 0r

warrant and With or Without cause”); Gawron, 112 Idaho

argument

that a probation condition requiring

unreasonable). Because Ofﬁcer

night, with or Without a search

at 843,

submission t0

736 P.2d

all

at

1297

(rej ecting

warrantless searches

was

Gumeson searched Kaneaster’s car pursuant t0 Kaneaster’s lawﬁJI

consent and waiver of his Fourth

Amendment

rights, the search

was reasonable under

the Fourth

Amendment.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Court afﬁrm the

district court’s

judgment.

DATED this 30th day 0f October, 2020.

/s/

Jeff Nye

JEFF NYE
Deputy Attorney General
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